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THE LOUISIANA ROAD HOME PROGRAM:
A PATH OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
EVERETT FINERAN, ESQ.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Louisiana Road Home Program (the "Program")-the
largest housing recovery program in U.S. historyl-was potentially
the most significant experiment in socialism that the United States
government has yet to engage. The experiment has failed. From
its inception, the Program has been riddled with problems that
could only be solved by allowing the free market to operate without intervention. Instead, the government has put the Program on
life support and artificially redeveloped an area that perhaps should
not be developed. The negative consequences of this massive
government intervention have perhaps just begun, as the Program
will be an utterly wasteful experiment if disaster repeats. This
article is a call to government planners to recognize that such
government intervention is not the solution to disaster recovery; a
lasting recovery will only take place when the government
assumes a role of referee and allows the free market to create
solutions within the framework of fair play.
Section II of this Article offers a detailed explanation of the
Program, including eligibility requirements, funding requirements,
and award calculations. Section III examines how the Program is
managed and discusses the shortcomings that have riddled the
Program from its inception. Next, Section IV offers an analysis of
the Program from a law and economics perspective. Finally,
Section V concludes that the Program will be a failure and should
instruct us that capitalism, not massive government intervention, is
the best and fastest method of recovering from disaster.

1The Road Home About Us, http://www.road2la.org/about-us/default.htm (last
visited May 7, 2007).
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THE PROGRAM

The Program was created through a joint effort by
Governor Kathleen Blanco, the Louisiana Recovery Authority, and
the Office of Community Development. 2 The stated objective of
the Program is to help Louisiana residents affected by Hurricane
Katrina "get back into a home or apartment as quickly and fairly as
possible." 3 The Program is entirely funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development and accordingly
implicates federal tax dollars.4
A. Eligibility Requirements and Assistance
Options
Although the Program is riddled with nuances that even
some of its own administrators do not understand, the basic
eligibility criteria and assistance options are relatively straightforward. To be eligible to apply for the Program, a homeowner 5
must have owned and lived in a property in Louisiana prior to

See id.
Although the Program does have assistance options for both rental property
owners and building professionals, this Article focuses on the homeowner
assistance component of the Program. This component represents the vast
majority of the funding to be allocated under the Program and accordingly will
have the greatest impact on the Louisiana housing market. For a more detailed
account of the rental assistance component of the Program, see THE ROAD HOME,
SMALL RENTAL PROPERTY PROGRAM OVERVIEW (2007), http://www.road2la.
org/rental-docs/rental overview3 8_07.pdf.
4 See id at 4.
' In most circumstances where title does not pass but the occupant is potentially
entitled to acquire title at some future point, such as in a bond for deed or lease
to own contract, the occupant is not entitled to apply for the Program. Owners
of usufructs, however, may be able to apply for the Program. Their eligibility is
2

3 Id.

determined on a case-by-case basis. See THE ROAD HOME, THE ROAD HOME
HOMEOWNER POLICIES VERSION 4.0 1 (2007), http://www.road2la.org/

Docs/TRHDeliverable_00035_HomeownerProgramPolicies4-15-07.pdf.
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either Hurricane Katrina or Rita.6 Homeowners of virtually every
type of housing, a double-unit structure, a town home, a mobile
home, or a condominium, are eligible for a Program so long as the
home was registered with FEMA and categorized as having been
"destroyed" or having incurred "substantial damage." 7 Even
homeowners who sold their home after Hurricane Katrina or Rita
may apply for the Program under the condition that their
after individuals who still own their
applications will be processed
8
homes are funded first.
Homeowners eligible for the Program have three assistance
options: the homeowner may elect to stay in Louisiana and rebuild,
to sell their current home to the State and relocate to another home
in Louisiana, or to sell their property to the State and relocate to
another state. 9 In all three situations, the homeowner must sign
agreements and covenants restricting how the homeowner may use
the funding.' 0
If the homeowner elects to rebuild the current home with
funding from the Program, he must establish occupancy within
three years of the closing on the grant, comply with any applicable
Advisory Board Flood Elevation requirements, maintain flood and
hazard insurance, and ensure that construction complies with
building codes." Although the homeowner may sell the property
after receiving the grant, the covenants "run with the land" and will
apply to the purchaser. 12 The covenants accordingly represent a
significant restraint on alienation.
Id. Establishing that the homeowner applied for a homestead exemption is
prima facie proof of home ownership. In the absence of proof of such an application, the homeowner can present a utility bill as proof of ownership.
7
d. at 2.
8 Id. at 3.

6

9 See id. at 4.

'0 See id.
" See Louisiana Road Home Information Page, http://www.road2la.org/
homeowner/eligibility-info.htm (last visited May 7, 2007). Although all new
constructions technically must always comply with building codes, the
significance of this covenant is that breach of it may require the homeowner to
return all funding received under the Program. Id.
12 Louisiana Road Home About Us Page, supra, note I I at 2.
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B. Funding Assistance Options
The Program gives homeowners four funding options.
First, the homeowner may elect to receive a general "compensation
grant" which may be used for basic rebuilding and renovation of
the property. 13 The homeowner may also receive an "additional
compensation" grant, not to exceed $50,000, for more esoteric
repairs. 14 The Program also provides an "elevation allowance,"
not to exceed $30,000. 15 The elevation grant is available to
homeowners who are located in areas with Advisory Base Flood
Elevation requirements. 16 Finally, homeowners may receive an
"additional mitigation grant," not to exceed $7,500, for non7
elevation mitigation measures such as installing storm shutters.1
In aggregate, no homeowner may receive more than
$150,000 under these four programs.' 8 With 130,328 applications
filed so far, the ostensible cap on assistance is accordingly nearly
$20 billion. 19 To put this amount in perspective, the entire 2004
budget for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the branch of the federal government that funded the

13

See THE

ROAD HOME HOMEOWNER POLICIES VERSION 4.0,

supra note 5, at 8-

12.
14 See id. at 14-15.
"5See id.

,6 See id. at 13.
17 See id. at 4.
There is scant information on what is covered under the
"additional mitigation grant" assistance program. In a recent article, however,
the Times Picayune suggested that this program will cover things like storm
shutters. See Law Governs Public Adjusters, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Nov. 19, 2006.
18 See THE ROAD HOME HOMEOWNER POLICIES VERSION 4.0,
supra note 5, at
14-15.

'9This figure represents the cap on spending. Most closings are for less than the
maximum a homeowner may receive under the program. In May of 2007, the
Program reported that its average closing was for $75,000. See David Hammer,
Road Home Going Broke, Blanco Says, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 2,
2007.
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Program, was just over $31 billion. 20 The Program is thus of
astounding scope.
C. Calculating Damages
Calculating the appropriate award for a given homeowner
is the point at which the Program convolutes. One rule in this
context, however, is clear: whatever compensation the homeowner
would otherwise be entitled to, he is credited for monies received
either from FEMA, the USDA, or private insurance for Katrinarelated losses. 2 ' However, so as not to reward those who failed to
obtain insurance before Hurricane Katrina, the Program imposes a
30% penalty on all applicants who failed to carry hazard insurance
or flood insurance where applicable. This penalty is imposed on
the total compensation grant.
Actually calculating damages is a little more complicated.
Under the general compensation grant program, the homeowner
who elects to stay in Louisiana receives the lesser of either the
estimated cost to rebuild the home as is determined by a home
evaluator or the uncompensated loss of value. 23 The uncompensated loss of value is determined by subtracting the compensation
the homeowner(s) received for structure loss from the home's prestorm value.24 The estimated pre-storm value of the home is
accordingly significant in this calculation, as the higher this figure
is estimated the greater the potential reward.
Applicants therefore have an incentive to overestimate the
pre-storm value of their home. To combat this potential for
mischief, the Program has adopted detailed guidelines as to what
20

See Press Release, Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD

Announces FY 2004 Proposed Budget of $31.3 Billion to Increase Homeownership, Promote Affordable Housing and Strengthen Communities (Feb. 2,
2003), http://www.hud.gov/news/release.cfn?contentprO3-OI4.cfm. The 2004
budget, of course, did not reflect spending for the Program.
2! See The Road Home Homeowner Policies Version 4.0, supra note 5, at 7.
22 Id. at 12.
23 See id.
24 See id.
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types of appraisals will be accepted and how appraisals are to be
performed.
The cost of repairs is determined according to one of two
evaluation "types."
Under an Evaluation Type 1, which is
appropriate when the home is more than 50% damaged, the cost of
repair is calculated by multiplying the square footage of the living
area in the home by $130.2 The homeowner may also receive a
2% additional allowance to cover builder's risk insurance. Under
an Evaluation Type 2, which is appropriate when the home is less
than 51% damaged, the evaluator uses his discretion to identify
what work needs to be done and then prepares an estimate.
Given the generosity of the $130 per square foot allowance
in an Evaluation Type 1,27 the homeowner has a significant
incentive to have his home deemed more than 50% damaged. The
program seeks to avoid the homeowner's incentive to exaggerate
damages by determining the appropriate Evaluation Type with a
specific method. 28 First, the home evaluator performs both
Evaluation Types. The percentage damage is then determined by
dividing the Evaluation Type 2 Cost Estimate by the Evaluation
Type 1 Cost Estimate and multiplying by 100.29 For example, if an
Evaluation Type 1 ($130 per square foot allowance) would
25

See id. at 8.

26

According to the National Association of Home Builders, who compiles

extensive annual data on home construction costs, in 2005 the average price per
square footage of construction in the south was $72.03. See NAT'L Ass'N OF
HOME BUILDERS, MEDIAN AND AVERAGE PRICE PER SQUARE FOOT OF FLOOR
AREA IN NEW ONE-FAMILY HOUSES SOLD BY LOCATION, http://www.

nahb.org/fileUpload-details.aspx?contentlD=560.
Even in the West, where
housing construction was the most expensive, the average cost of construction
was only $114.45. Id. The $130 per square foot construction allowance accordingly seems a bit exorbitant. Although Program administrators likely intentionally overestimated the cost of construction to account for increased
construction expenses in the area due to a shortage of workers, their $130 per
foot approximation will give homeowners a windfall.
27 See Hammer, supra note
19.
28 See The Road Home Homeowner Policies Version 4.0, supra note 5, at I.
29 See id. (The percent damage will be calculated by the following the equation:
(Evaluation Type 2 Cost Estimate/Evaluation Type I Cost Estimate) x 100 = %
Damage.
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estimate repairs as costing $100,000 and the Evaluation Type 2
(evaluator discretion) would estimate repairs as costing $50,000,
then the property would be deemed 50% damaged.30
Calculating the damages for homeowners who elect to sell
their home and relocate to somewhere in Louisiana is the same
with one significant difference. If the homeowner's property was
greater than 51% damaged by Hurricane Katrina or Rita, then the
homeowner is allowed only the uncompensated loss of value. 3' Of
course, this amount is in addition to the price that the State already
paid to purchase the home.
Homeowners who elect to sell their home to the State and
move out of Louisiana are penalized under the Program. In this
context, a homeowner with less than 51% property damage will
receive the lesser of the cost of damage or 60% of their
uncompensated loss of value. 32 If the homeowner had more than
50% property damage, then he will receive 60% of his
uncompensated loss of value. 33 Accordingly, in most instances the
Program imposes a 40% penalty for moving out of state-a
powerful incentive for homeowners to stay.
III.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE PROGRAM
A. The Players

The Louisiana Recovery Authority (LRA) is the
governmental body that oversees the administration of the Program.
However, although the LRA has over 20 employees-including
legal personnel, budget and policy planners, and research and
development assistants-it does not actually administer the
" ($50,000/$ 100,000) x 100 = 50% damage.
31 See The Road Home Homeowner Policies Version 4.0, supra note 5, at 12.
On the other hand, if the homeowner's property was less than 51%damaged, he
or she will receive the lesser of the uncompensated cost of damage or the
uncompensated loss of value up to $150,000, just as would a homeowner who
stays in the home.
32 See

33

id.

id. at 13.
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Program. 34 Instead, the LRA opted to outsource the Program in
May of June 2006 to ICF International.35 As part of the deal, ICF
obtained a contract to handle the administration of the Program for
36
three years. The contract included a budget of over $756 million.
B. When Disaster Struck Again: The Road
Home Program in Action
Putting aside the issue for a moment of whether society
even benefits from a recovery program like the Road Home, there
is the more immediate and practical concern of how effectively the
Program has been administered. With incessant newspaper titles
like "Road Home? Not yet for 90% of Applicants" 37 and
"Understaffed and Overwhelmed, 38 it is difficult to perceive the
program as having been anything other than a fiasco. The company administering the program has stumbled every step of the
way--constantly missing deadlines, misapplying the rules, and
making an overwhelming amount of simple clerical errors.
1. Mismanagement and Misuse of Resources
From the beginning of its role as administer of the Program,
ICF has failed to design even basic systems to handle the job.
Hundreds of applicants immediately complained that their
applications were ignored or that their calls were returned or that
ICF representative were simply too incompetent to answer even

Louisiana Recovery Authority Staff Page, http://www.lra.louisiana.gov/staff.
html (last visited May 7, 2007).
35 Press Release, ICF Int'l, ICF International Awarded Major Contract to Help
Rebuild Louisiana Housing Infrastructure (June 30, 2006), http://www.icfi.com/
newsroom/road-home-2006.asp.
36 Jeffrey Meitrodt, Understaffed and Overwhelmed, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New
Orleans), Jan. 28, 2007, at Al.
34

37 Editorial, 'Road Home'? Not Yet for 90% of Applicants, DAILY TOWN TALK

(Alexandria, LA), May 4, 2007, at C5.
38

See supra note 36.
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basic questions. 39 The company could not seem to get anything
right:
The record shows ICF making critical misjudgments almost
every step of the way, typically by failing to bring sufficient staff resources to bear as applicants move through the
process. A shortage of operators at a phone call-in center is
addressed, only to be followed by a shortage of interviewers as applicants sign up for face-to-face encounters
with ICF advisers. 40
In response to the immediately-apparent shortcomings of
ICF's administration of the Program, Governor Blanco repeatedly
issued goals as to how many award letters and closings the
company
should issue at set intervals. 4' Initially, Governor
Blanco
set the audacious goal of beginning to make whole-scale disbursements under the Program on August 29, 2006-just one year from
Hurricane Katrina. E Although ICF did in fact make three
disbursements in August of 2006, the trend of success stopped
there. 43 Even 16 months post-Katrina-four months after Blanco's
deadline to begin making full-scale disbursements-ICF had
issued grant to fewer than 250 applicants. 4 At the time, these
disbursements represented 0.00025% of total applications.45
See Meitrodt, supranote 36, at 2.
Id. It is not clear exactly what caused the problems ICF faced with administering the program. Although one state official accused the company with
under-spending in order to increase its profits, the company correctly pointed
out that its $756 million contract was not a fee but a budget from which the state
pays for expenses incurred. Id. Accordingly, any funds not spent pursuant to
the budget inure to the state and not ICF. Id. Some attribute the problems to a
company that it not motivated in light of a secure contract with the government.
"Either somebody doesn't care or they're incompetent," said state Sen. Ed
Murray of ICF. Melinda Deslatte, Katrina's Aftermath; Louisiana Lawmakers
Blast 'Road Home', HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 8, 2006, at A6.
41 See Meitrodt, supra note 36.
39
40

42

41
44
41

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Another criticism of the Program is that has been
"continually evolving." 46 The Program has repeatedly changed its
application requirements, calculation guidelines, and appraisal
techniques. Changing basic criteria midstream like the Program
has so often done confuses applicants and makes them uncomfortable with their decision to stay in Louisiana-the opposite
effect that the Program was designed to have.
2. The Installment Plan Debacle
Where changes were needed to expedite the process,
however, the LRA has been unable to affect them. The LRA
originally designed disbursements under the Program to be made
in installments. 47

Accordingly,

homeowners

would receive

periodic funding tied to the completion of renovation projects.
This type of plan is consistent with how mortgage lenders typically
make construction lenders. Indeed, it was mortgage lenders who
had effectively lobbied for an installment plan in order to insure
that homeowners actually spend the disbursements on the property
in which the lenders have an existing mortgage interest.48
In designing this disbursement schedule, however, state
planners failed to account for important federal regulations. An
installment schedule that required homeowner to prove completion
of renovation projects like the one LRA had designed would likely
be deemed a "forced rehabilitation program." 49 Such a program
was necessarily subject to costly environmental and labor
reviews. 50 In early 2007, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) indeed ruled that the installment plan was a
forced rehabilitation program subject to these regulations.

46 Brian Friedman, Changing Rules Make it Hardfor Homeowners to Keep Up,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Mar. 15, 2007.
47 David Hammer, Road Home Faces Detour; Lenders Want to Keep Installment
Option, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 2, 2007.
48 See id.
49 Id.
50 See id.
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Baffled by the decision and unable to reach a compromise
with the federal authorities, the LRA ordered the Program to stop
State representatives immediately
sending award letters. 51
succumbed to the reality that disbursements would have to be
made in lump-sum payments in order to avoid complying with the
applicable federal regulations. And so the spin began. The LRA
characterized the change-which effectively required the entire
Program to be shut down for a number of weeks-as being made
for the benefit of the public. "The advantage of a direct payment
would be that homeowners have immediate access to their entire
grant award for repairs, and would be in the driver's seat in
negotiating with their lender regarding the repayment of any
arrearages," or back payments owed on the mortgage," said the
Chairman of LRA. 52 "We heard the public loud and clear, and this
option would give them what they asked for-sole access to their
grant award within days of their closing," Leger said.
Mortgage lenders, however, were not so pleased with the
change and voiced several concerns--concems that the LRA had
initially found significant enough to warrant adopting an
installment plan. Lenders noted that handing out money as a lump
sum payment "will be an open invitation for homeowner to use the
money on other things, leading to rampant blight that drives down
property value for everyone-including those neighbors who are
responsible enough to rebuild.",53 Although a covenant would
prevent applicants from spending the money on something other
than repairs, the state would have to wait three years to see
whether the applicant made a good faith effort to use the funds
appropriately and reside in the home, perpetuating the54 blight in
many instances with no recourse when it is needed most.

51 id.
52

David Hammer, Road Home Poised to Start Lump-Sum Payments, TIMES-

PICAYUNE
53

(New Orleans), Apr. 4,2007.

Hammer, Road Home Faces Detour, supra note 47. Of course, the mortgage

lenders have a significant interest in seeing an appreciation in the overall
p4roperty value in any area in which the lender has existing mortgage interests.
'3

See id.
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In retrospect, the installment plan debacle was but just one
of a series of incompetent decisions made by the administrators of
the Program. As of May 2007, the Program continued to suffer
from the same problems that have plagued it from its inception:
The incompetence known as Louisiana's "Road Home"
program continues to hit new lows. Its hallmarks are a
painfully slow application and review process, an even
slower cutting of checks to the people who need the money
and the obvious lack of accountability that stretches from
the Governor's Mansion in Baton Rouge to the offices of
ICF International in Fairfax, Va.

. . .

[The Program]

highlights everything that is wrong with the state-government mismanagement, bureaucratic inertia, a historic bias
against the people of the state and the complete absence of
accountability.55
The amount of closings the Program has made, the most
telling statistic of administrative success, paints a grim picture. As
of May 2007, nearly two years after Hurricane Katrina, just 10% of
applications had gone to closing.56 If the objective of the Program
was "to help people get back into a home . . . as quickly as

possible," it has miserably failed.57
3. The Public Relations Campaign Debacle
Criticism of the Program and the ICF became so harsh that
in March of 2007 Program authorities decided to institute a $1.6
million public relations advertising campaign. 58 The advertisements featured individuals who had received funding praising the
Program for its merit and encouraging those with applications
55 Road Home'? Not Yet for 90% ofApplicants, supra note 37.

56 id.
57 See THE ROAD HOME HOMEOWNER POLICIES VERSION 4.0, supra note 5 and

accompanying text.
58

Posting of Susan Steward-Barre to Think New Orleans, http://thinknola.com/

post/the-road-home-program-goes-to-hollywood/ (Apr. 25, 2007 12:20 EST).
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pending to remain patient. In one scene, a group of individuals
celebrate in harmony that "The Road Home is A TEAM! The
Road Home team tackled my rebuilding problem and made a
touchdown for us," while raising their hands in the air as if a
Another scene features a couple
touchdown had been made.
saying "The Road Home really is the light at the end of the tunnel.
than we ever expected and now we have
They gave us much more
60
gone on with our lives."
Aside from being obnoxiously simplistic and paternalistic,
the advertisements demonstrated the type of unfettered waste of
resources that has characterized the Program from the beginning.
In May of 2007 it became evident that due to a variety of factorsthe squander of resources and more applications than expectedthe Program would not have enough funding to service all existing
applications. 61 In light of this potentially significant shortfall (by
some accounts, $2 billion), the state House Appropriations Committee contemplated a measure that would force the Program to
freeze all spending on advertising. 62 To avoid further embarrassment, officials quietly cancelled the campaign before the measure
could be passed.63
C. Why Did the Program Fail?
A number of theories have been offered as to why the
Program has failed in so many respects and for so long. Some
have attributed the failure to a shortcoming in oversight, others to
poor planning by the LRA, and still others to an incompetent
implementation of the plan by the ICF. Although the failure of the
Program is probably due to a variety of causes, it seems evident
that it did not necessarily have to fail so miserably.

59
60
61

Road Home? Not Yet for 90% ofApplicant, supra note 37.
Id.
See Jan Molter, Amid bad ratings, TV blitz touting Road Home canceled,

TiMES-PICAYUNE
62

63

See id.
See id.

(New Orleans), May 9, 2007, at Al.
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Professor John Lovett of the Loyola University College of
Law notes that Mississippi's counterpart to the Louisiana Program
demonstrates how the Program could have avoided many of the
blunders through better planning. 64 First, the Mississippi plan is
much easier to implement because calculating damages is so
straightforward. Under that plan, damages are calculated by taking
the insured value of an eligible home (an indisputable figure) and
multiplying this figure by the percentage of damage the home
suffered.65 The homeowner then receives a check for this amount,
not to exceed $150,000, less any compensation from private insurance or FEMA.
The plan also has a significantly faster application-to-close
processing time because the homeowner is not subjected to any
covenants as to how he can use the funding. Once the funds are
distributed, the homeowner can use them any way he sees fit and
need not actually repair his home. The result of these distinctions
is that the Louisiana plan is "considerably66 more complex and
costly to administer than Mississippi's plan."
IV.

A LAW AND ECONOMICS CRITIQUE OF
THE PROGRAM

Although by most standards the Program has failed, a more
important issue is whether any recovery program of this magnitude
is an appropriate use of public resources. The Program took
billions of national tax dollars and devoted them to revitalizing an
area devastated by a natural disaster. Because the United States is
likely to see another disaster of this proportion again-perhaps
even another disaster of this proportion in Louisiana-it is
important to reflect now on whether the significant tax money
spent on the area was the best use of our limited national resources.

64 John Lovett, Why Can't Our
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
65

See id.

66

id.

Road Home be as Simple as Mississippi's?,
Aug. 17, 2006.

2007-2008

The Louisiana Road Home Program
A. The Economic Propriety of "Public
Insurance"

First, there is the basic issue of whether using public
resources to subsidize housing costs on such a widespread basis is
even appropriate at all. The obvious alternative would be to leave
this task to the private market. The market has indeed developed a
powerful vehicle in the form of private insurance with which
people can minimize the risk of loss from a disaster like Hurricane
Katrina. As a matter of fairness, it seems appropriate to leave
recovery funding to the private sector in this respect. No one can
claim to be without notice prior to Katrina that New Orleans was
subject to flooding.67 Accordingly, most of those who chose not to
obtain insurance before the storm knowingly bore the risk of loss.
These individuals ostensibly valued the amount of the insurance
premiums more than they did the potential insurance proceeds
subsequent to a disaster.
This analysis, however, may be a bit too simplistic. Some
people who did not obtain insurance prior to the storm simply
could not afford to do so. Perhaps these individuals bought or
inherited inexpensive property in which they could hardly afford a
mortgage note and property taxes, much less premiums for hazard
and flood insurance. At least as to these individuals, there is
nothing more they could have done to protect themselves from
disaster.
Nonetheless, transforming the government into a private
insurer of these individuals is neither fair to the public who funds
this type of "insurance" with tax dollars nor is it in the best longterm interest of society. New Orleans is categorically a risky place
to live. In the spirit of freedom, those who want to incur this risk
by living here should be allowed to do so. But they should do so at
their own risk and not at the risk of society at large. If society bails
those out who did not obtain proper insurance, 68 it is sending a
67

See infra note 70 and accompanying text.

68 Of

course, the Road Home Program attempts to alleviate some of this effect

by imposing a 30% penalty on those who failed to obtain insurance when it was
prudent to do so. See ROAD HOME, supra note 22 and accompanying text. This
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message to future market participants that they need not heed the
risks of where they live; society will reallocate private resourcesthe resources of many who have already born their own risk of loss
from disaster-to rescue those who did not have such foresight.
Aside from these basic issues of risk and resource allocation, this system is dangerous because it has the potential to perpetuate the need for a massive public bailout that we now face. As
noted, much of the funding under the Road Home Program will be
allocated to aiding those in low-income areas where homeowners
could not afford insurance. Left to their own resources these
individuals would not be able to repair their housing. They would
be left with only one economically-valid option-sell their house
to a private market participant who can put the property to better
use. 69 The purchaser, being in a better economic position than the
seller, could then purchase private insurance or take other
measures to mitigate the risk of loss from disaster.
In contrast, the Program that Louisiana has adopted enables
these individuals to fix their housing with public resources and
again take up residence there. In most cases in the same or worse
economic position than they were before the storm, these
individuals will move back into their houses still unable to afford
insurance premiums. 70 The Program attempts to mitigate this
effect by requiring those receiving grants to sign covenants
71
agreeing to maintain hazard and flood insurance on the property.
penalty, however, is arguably too insignificant to have an impact on future
behavior of market participants, particularly those who could not afford
insurance anyway.
69 Of course, some areas may be too risky to attract
any such purchasers. In
such a situation, the private market has determined that the risk of loss from
disaster in this particular area is not commensurate with the benefits of living
there.
70 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the poorest areas
in New
Orleans-New Orleans East and the Lower Ninth Ward-are by no coincidence
the lowest areas in the city. See Leslie Williams, Study Busts Myth that New
Orleans is Sunken City, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 20, 2007. Those
who move back into areas with the greatest risk of loss from a disaster are thus
those who are also least likely to maintain adequate insurance.
71 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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But given the way the program has been administered thus far,
enforcement of these covenants seems comical. Moreover, applicants will have three years to establish residence, in the interim
using the grant money at the risk of the public.
Some argue, however, that despite these legitimate concerns bailing out these individuals is necessary as a matter of
equity because the government enticed them to move into these
areas by building levees. These individuals were given a false
sense of security by a flawed levee system, so the argument goes,
and thus should be compensated for the losses that they would not
have incurred but for having moved into the area under false
pretenses.
As a preliminary matter, as to many individuals this argument is entirely invalid because it rests on inaccurate assumptions.
Those moving into new housing in New Orleans in the past
quarter-century have been repeatedly warned that our levee system
72
could potentially breach or be overtopped in a major hurricane.
Even assuming that the argument is valid as to some individuals
who moved into their housing before the discovery of the flaws in
the levee system, the argument nonetheless fails.
That the government has presumably made mistakes in the
past by building a flawed levee system is no sound justification for
continuing to make a similar mistake by enticing people to stay
under the reach of a still-flawed system. Implementing a massive
government bailout like the Program is just another improper
inducement for those to stay who otherwise would (and should) not.
And now these individuals will indeed have a legitimate basis for
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The newspaper headlines for the five years before Katrina were eerily

ominous in this regard. See Kimm Cobb, New Orleans gambles on New Pumps,
Canals; City's Levees May Hold, but a Big Storm Would Just Wash Over Them,
HOUSTON CHRON., Sep. 16, 2004, at 14; Mark Schleifstein, The Big One; A
major hurricane Could Decimate the Region, but Flooding from Even a
Moderate Storm Could Kill Thousands. It's just a Matter of Time, TIMESPICAYUNE (New Orleans), June 24, 2002 at 1; Mark Schleifstein, Corps' Storm
Plan Grim; Flooding Could Last 6 months, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Nov. 16, 2000 at 1.
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assuming that the government would73 bail them out again in the
event of another disaster in the future.
B. A Public Road Home-Is There Even Such a
Thing?
Although to some degree the verdict is still out, the Road
Home Program so far has been a perfect example of how government subsidies can cause a snowball of unintended consequences.
The Program has been so inefficient that, rather than expediting
recovery, it has caused a standstill while the public waits for more
information before it makes a move. Knowing how large of a
grant one will receive under the program-a grant potentially as
high as $150,000-is probably the most significant piece of
information most people will have in deciding whether to rebuild
or relocate. But two years from Katrina only 10% of people have
received funding under the Program, while the other 90% have lost
faith in a demonstrably incompetent system.
The delay is significant because it has perpetuated the
shortage of housing. A shortage in housing means a shortage in
workers, and a shortage in workers means a stay in economic
activity. Businesses have thus had the choice to shut down until
conditions improve, to temporarily do business somewhere else, or
to permanently relocate. The longer the shortage in housing lasts,
the more businesses are likely to choose the latter course.
In contrast, in the absence of a Road Home Program
homeowners would have had less incentive to postpone their
decisions. Inevitably many homeowners would have opted to
move in light of the risks inherent in staying. But at least they
would have then sold their homes to private investors or intrastate
immigrants at a discounted rate, making more housing available
and expediting recovery. Moreover, many homeowners would
In any case, this argument is really one for tort liability that is best addressed
by the courts. The courts rather than the legislature are best suited to determine
issues of due care, causation, and damages. In this regard, a case is pending
against the Army Corp of Engineers. For more on this class action suit, see
http://www.leveelaw.com.
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have incurred private loans to rebuild, thus immediately injecting
money into the local economy.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Louisiana Road Home Program has been a prototypical
example of the law of unintended consequences. There were
simply too many negative market implications to such a massive
program for state planners to effectively mitigate. Moreover,
implementing such a massive program without the aid of private
market forces directing the activity was bound to spell trouble. The
result has been a system that has delayed rather than prevented
recovery. Future disaster recovery planners should take heed to
the lessons learned through the Road Home experience and adopt a
plan that seeks only to facilitate private market forces in the aftermath of a disaster. Anything else will likely only stifle recovery.

